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FOREWORD
The prestige the U.S. military establishment enjoys today
stands in sharp contrast with its reputation of a decade ago.
Starting with America's military involvement in Viet Nam and
culminating with the Iran hostage rescue attempt, the Beirut
bombing, and the Grenada intervention, the U.S. armed forces
endured a prolonged period of criticism. The experiences of that
period, inter alia, convinced the U.S. Congress that the
Department of Defense required a major overhaul.
The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act was the most significant legislation for the
U.S. Armed Forces since the National Security Act of 1947. The
increased unification the Goldwater-Nichols Act was intended to
bring to the Department of Defense was considered too extreme by
some, but insufficient by others. In this monograph, Professor
Douglas Lovelace assesses many of the act's major provisions. He
describes the congressional motivation for passing the act,
assesses the extent to which the act has been implemented,
discusses its impact on the Department of Defense, and offers
recommendations for furthering the purposes underlying the act.
The author's critical analysis leads him to conclude that
the Department of Defense and the nation have benefitted from the
substantial implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. As we
approach its 10-year anniversary, however, Professor Lovelace
finds significant room both for the Department of Defense to
complete implementation and for the Congress to enact
modifications to more coherently focus the act on its central
purposes. His thought-provoking analyses, conclusions, and
recommendations should fuel discussions of the extent to which
the act has, or can, achieve its intended results.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this
report as a contribution to the assessment of the first decade of
the post-Goldwater-Nichols era.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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PRECIS
Since the end of World War II, Congress has taken
significant measures to unify the Armed Forces of the United
States. The National Security Act of 1947 marked the beginning of
the unification trend. Congress continued the evolutionary
process by passing the 1949 and 1958 amendments. In 1986,
Congress passed seminal legislation that significantly
reorganized the Department of Defense (DOD), moving it further
toward a unified structure. In the Goldwater-Nichols Department
of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (GNA), Congress sought to
strengthen civilian control of DOD, improve military advice to
civilian leadership, clarify the authority and responsibilities
of the combatant commanders, improve strategy formulation and
contingency planning, and provide for more efficient use of
defense resources. As the 10th anniversary of the passage of the
GNA approaches, it is appropriate to examine the act's impact.
This study assesses the extent to which the GNA has been
implemented, examines whether Congress' intent has been realized,
evaluates the impact the act has had on DOD, and discusses what
measures should be taken to consummate or curtail implementation.
The analysis and assessment herein show that DOD has
substantially implemented the act, but also that implementation
is incomplete.
• Generally, the provisions of the act intended to
strengthen civilian control over DOD have been effectively
implemented.
-By promulgating the Defense Planning Guidance document,
the Secretary of Defense has increased his authority over the
development of programs and budgets. However, the practice of
publishing a new document annually denies DOD components needed
planning stability.
-The secretary has asserted control of the contingency
planning process by providing the Contingency Planning Guidance
document to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
commanders-in-chief (CINCs) of the combatant commands.
• The act improved the military advice provided to the
National Command Authorities (NCA) by increasing the authority
and responsibilities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. However, it also allowed the chairman to formulate
military advice without consulting the other members of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) by permitting him to consult them as he
considers appropriate.
• The act clarified the authority and responsibilities of
the CINCs of the combatant commands, but not to the extent
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Congress intended. Also, ambiguity still exists with respect to
the chain(s) of command.
• The act has not been fully implemented with respect to
strategy formulation. The national security strategy reports
submitted to date have not been as comprehensive as Congress
specified.
• The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff does not prepare
the type of strategic plans called for in the act.
• Although emphasis on the military requirements of the
combatant commands has increased, the services continue to
dominate the requirements determination process.
• An effective system for evaluating the preparedness of the
combatant commands to carry out their assigned missions, for
identifying force capability strengths and deficiencies, and for
assessing the impact of such strengths and deficiencies on
strategic plans and policy has yet to be implemented.
• The congressional intent regarding joint doctrine has been
accomplished. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has
developed a robust body of joint doctrine that, inter alia,
harmonizes and rationalizes the operational roles of forces
provided by the services. In doing so, joint doctrine facilitates
effective and efficient application of defense resources.
• Congressional intent concerning the review and
reallocation of roles and functions among the services has not
been completely realized.
• The congressional intent for the periodic review and
adjustment of the missions, responsibilities, and force
structures of the combatant commands has been largely effected.
• The Department of Defense has improved the quality of
joint staffs by implementing the joint officer management
provisions of the act, but that effort may have been constrained
by negative effects on officers who serve in joint assignments.
These conclusions and their underlying analyses suggest
several recommendations:
• Congress should insist that presidents produce national
security strategy reports that are as comprehensive and specific
as the act requires.
• The Secretary of Defense should promote stability in
defense program planning by reverting to a biennial Defense
Planning Guidance publication cycle. Congress should amend the
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Goldwater-Nichols Act to permit biennial publication.
• The secretary should establish policy to ensure that the
chairman adequately consults with the other members of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. Congress should amend the act to instruct the
chairman to consult the other members on all issues with
potential impact on the services, while allowing him to remain
unbound by such consultations.
• The secretary should conduct a review of the relationship
of the CINCs to their Service component commanders and the
latter's relationship to their Service Chiefs. The review should
affirm the chain of command from the NCA to the CINCs and develop
a concept for the chain of command that runs from the NCA through
the Military Departments. Congress should amend the GNA to
recognize, define, and describe both chains of command.
• The secretary should establish policy that a certain
percentage of Service "OPTEMPO" funding be dedicated to joint
training and exercises. Congress should revise the GNA, expressly
authorizing the secretary to do so.
• The chairman should develop national military strategic
plans keyed to the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) periods.
• The Secretary of Defense, in accordance with the GNA,
should transfer responsibility for administering the Integrated
Priority List (IPL) process to the chairman from the Director for
Program Analysis and Evaluation within the Office of the
Secretary of Defense. The chairman should restructure the process
so that it focuses on specific capabilities needed rather than
particular programs, and should use the IPLs as the primary basis
for determining military requirements.
• The chairman should develop and implement a system for
evaluating the preparedness of the combatant commands that does
not rely on self-evaluations by the commands. The system also
should identify force strengths and deficiencies as well as
assess their impact on accomplishing national security objectives
and on strategic plans.
• As the Joint Warfighting Center matures, the chairman
should continue to increase its oversight of the joint doctrine
development process.
• If it is the sense of Congress that significant changes in
the roles and functions of the U.S. armed forces are required, it
should establish its own commission to identify needed changes
and propose appropriate legislation.
• The secretary should continue to emphasize full
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implementation of the joint officer management provisions of the
GNA with the objective of bringing all services into compliance.
• Congress should add language to the act which would ensure
officers are not rendered less competitive for promotion for
having received joint education and having served in joint
assignments.
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UNIFICATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES:
IMPLEMENTING THE
1986 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REORGANIZATION ACT
INTRODUCTION
Reorganizing the military establishment of the United States
has been a subject of considerable congressional interest
throughout much of this century. As early as 1921, Congress began
considering proposals to combine or unify the military
departments under a single executive agency. Between 1921 and
1945, for example, Congress considered some 50 proposals to
reorganize the United States armed forces. Due largely to
opposition from the Departments of War and Navy, however, none of
these initiatives resulted in legislation.1
The experiences of World War II made it clear that, for the
U.S. armed forces, future warfare would be increasingly
characterized by unified operations,2 and that a centrally
coordinated process for providing U.S. military capabilities was
needed. In a message to Congress (December 1945), President
Truman stated that "there is enough evidence now at hand to
demonstrate beyond question the need for a unified department."
He urged Congress to ". . . adopt legislation combining the War
and Navy departments into one single Department of National
Defense."3 President Truman's message led to the National
Security Act of 1947 which created the "National Military
Establishment" and initiated a trend toward unification of the
U.S. armed forces that would continue throughout the remainder of
the century.4
The type of unification advanced by legislation and
considered in this study would not ultimately eliminate the
separate services or merge the military departments into one.5 As
used herein, unification refers to the centralized direction of
the U.S. armed forces and the concomitant subordination of the
military departments and services to a centralized control
structure. This contrasts with a separatist approach by which
each military department would be a relatively autonomous
organization coordinating, and perhaps synchronizing, its
activities with the other departments, but retaining essential
decision making autonomy in most areas.
The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization
Act of 1986, informally called the Goldwater-Nichols Act or GNA,
was the most comprehensive defense reorganization package enacted
since the 1947 National Security Act. Designed to accelerate the
unification of the U.S. armed forces by fundamentally altering
the manner in which they were raised, trained, commanded, and
employed, the GNA impacted virtually all major elements of DOD.
Many consider the GNA as instrumental in the success of U.S.
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forces during Operation DESERT STORM. Nonetheless, a decade after
its passage, there is evidence which suggests that this seminal
legislation has yet to be fully implemented. There also are
indications that implementation may have already gone too far in
consolidating authority within the offices of the Secretary of
Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), at
the expense of the military departments and services. The first
purpose of this study, therefore, is to assess the extent to
which the provisions of the GNA have been implemented within the
framework of the act's eight stated objectives.6 The study also
assesses the general effects the GNA has had on the U.S. armed
forces and offers conclusions and recommendations for achieving
the improvements Congress intended when it passed the GNA. The
assessment begins by taking into account the act's historical
context, particularly the events that directly contributed to its
passage.
EARLY UNIFICATION EFFORTS AND CONCERNS
How best to balance the unified and separatist approaches to
DOD organization has been a challenge that has confronted
Congress over the years. Since 1947, Congress has gravitated
toward the unification pole of these contrasting views of armed
forces organization, but the attraction of the separatist
philosophy remains significant. Since the end of World War II,
almost every Secretary of Defense has supported increased
centralization of authority. The military departments, on the
other hand, have generally attempted to retain their autonomy.
In attempts to craft the most effective balance between
these opposing forces, Congress has also had to consider a third
factor. Increased unification of the U.S. armed forces erodes
congressional control over the military, and Congress has sought
to limit that effect by not over-centralizing authority within
the executive branch.7 The interaction of these dynamics has
resulted in an evolutionary unification process that the GNA has
perpetuated, and which continues as the provisions of the act are
implemented.
A review of the defense reorganization legislation that
preceded the GNA assists in constructing a contextual background
for assessing the act and illustrates its relative significance.
The National Security Act of 1947 was the first, albeit
relatively ineffective, piece of unification legislation.
Although the act created the position of Secretary of Defense, it
gave the secretary no real authority over the Secretaries of the
Army, Navy, or Air Force. Congress perceived both the benefits
and the dangers associated with unification, and decided not to
enact more radical legislation for fear of yielding much of its
control over the military to the Executive Branch.8 By 1949,
however, the Executive Branch was pressing for legislation to
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achieve greater unification. Commenting on the National Security
Act, President Truman, in a March 1949 message to Congress,
stated:
This act has provided a practical and workable basis
for beginning the unification of the military services
and for coordinating military policy with foreign and
economic policy . . . The past eighteen months have
dispelled any doubt that unification of the armed
forces can yield great advantages to the nation . . .
[but] the act fails to provide for a fully responsible
official with authority adequate to meet his
responsibility, whom the president and the congress can
hold accountable.9
The 1949 Amendment to the National Security Act represented
an important, but limited, step in further unifying the U.S.
military establishment. Congress established the Department of
Defense as an executive department and made the Secretary of
Defense responsible for its general direction. It also
redesignated the executive departments of the Army, Navy, and Air
Force as military departments, reducing them in stature, but
instructed that they continue to be "separately administered."10
The congressional intent stated in Section 2 of the
Amendment was:
. . . to provide three Military Departments, separately
administered, . . . to provide for their authoritative
coordination and unified direction under civilian
control of the Secretary of Defense but not to merge
them . . . and for their integration into an efficient
team of land, naval, and air forces but not to
establish a single Chief of Staff over the armed forces
nor an armed forces general staff (but this is not to
be interpreted as applying to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
11
or Joint Staff) [emphasis in original].
An important feature of the 1949 Amendment was that, while
clearly avoiding the actual merging of the military departments
and the creation of a "single Chief of Staff," the amendment
provided for a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), which
were established in 1947 to serve as the principal military
advisers to the president, National Security Council (NSC), and
the Secretary of Defense.12 The JCS Chairman was assigned
significantly circumscribed authority. He was not to exercise
command over the military services nor the Joint Chiefs, and, in
fact, he was not even a voting member of the JCS.13
With the 1949 Amendment to the National Security Act,
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Congress took a further step toward unifying the armed forces but
stopped short of merging the military departments. Nonetheless,
unification pressures continued. By 1958, the benefits of unified
strategic direction of the armed forces were more apparent, but
Congress still feared the creation of too much centralized
authority over the military. The Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1958, amending the National Security Act of
1947, nonetheless gave the Secretary of Defense real authority
over the U.S. military establishment, to include the power to
reorganize the Department of Defense. The amendment modified the
requirement that the military departments be "separately
administered" to say that they must be "separately organized."14
The 1958 Act,
further subordinated the Military Departments to the
central authority of the Secretary of Defense,
established the chain of command from the President,
through the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, to the unified and specified commands, and
provided for the central direction and control of
research and development.15
During the three decades that followed, there was little
congressional action to unify the U.S. armed forces; however, the
Secretary of Defense used his increased authority to take limited
steps toward further unification.16 In the early 1980s, however,
several events helped shape a congressional consensus that DOD
required significant reform.
THE ROAD TO REFORM
The Iran Hostage Rescue Attempt.
On November 4, 1979, Iranian militants stormed the U.S.
Embassy in Tehran, seizing 53 American hostages. The attack on
the embassy should not have come as a complete surprise. Almost 9
months earlier, a similar incident occurred but was resolved
diplomatically.17 Although a contingency plan for the evacuation
of U.S. personnel existed,18 it is unclear if the JCS, in
response to the first attack on the embassy, advised the
Secretary of Defense or the president that the contingency plan
should be made ready for potential execution. In any event, over
5 months elapsed after the second seizure and the taking of
American hostages before the United States mounted a military
response.
The U.S. national leadership was confronted with a situation
for which it seemed unprepared. Direct White House supervision,
excessive devotion to secrecy and compartmentation, and a general
circumvention of the established crisis action planning process
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characterized operational planning for the rescue mission.19 The
plan that resulted was "joint"20 in that it included forces from
all services but, at the same time, it was not a unified
operation in that it did not provide for unified command, unified
action, or joint training of the forces.21 Acting on the advice
of the JCS that the high-risk mission had a better-than-average
chance of succeeding, President Carter directed that the
operation be executed.22
Operation EAGLE CLAW, designed to rescue the hostages
quickly and dramatically, ended in catastrophe. American
planning, equipment, tactics, and leadership proved inadequate.23
Eight servicemen on the mission were killed, expensive U.S.
equipment and classified information were abandoned, and not a
single hostage was rescued.24 The entire world wondered if the
United States had indeed become a military "paper tiger."
In the months following the failed rescue attempt, a stunned
American public endured the daily media reminders of the
continued plight of the hostages and America's inability to do
anything about it.25 It is not surprising that the Iran hostage
rescue experience aroused congressional suspicions that serious
problems existed concerning how the U.S. armed forces were
commanded, organized, trained, and employed, and that remedial
action was required.26 Those suspicions were confirmed by
subsequent events.
Beirut.
During fall 1983, congressional concern over the command,
organization, and employment of U.S. armed forces again peaked
following a military disaster. The previous year, some 1,200 U.S.
Marines joined French and Italian contingents in a multinational
force. Their mission was to preserve peace in and around Beirut,
Lebanon, facilitate the restoration of the sovereignty and
authority of Lebanon's government, and help bring peace to the
war-torn country. The Marines occupied positions in the vicinity
of Beirut International Airport.
In April 1983, a massive explosion destroyed the U.S.
Embassy in Beirut, killing 17 U.S. citizens and over 40 others.
Fighting between indigenous factions intensified throughout the
spring and summer. From March through October 1983, the Marines
suffered a number of casualties (4 dead and 15 wounded) from the
various factions involved in Lebanon's civil war.27 Events
culminated on October 23, 1983, when a suicide bomber attacked
the Marines' headquarters building, killing 241 U.S. military
personnel and wounding over 100 others.28 Shortly thereafter,
President Reagan withdrew the remaining U.S. forces.29
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Congressional reaction was swift. A delegation from the
Investigations Subcommittee of the House of Representatives
Committee on Armed Services arrived in Beirut by December 12,
1983. Their report to the Committee Chairman (December 19, 1983)
criticized several military aspects of the incident. Transcending
the tactical level, the more notable criticisms included an
ambiguous chain of command, lack of proper oversight by higher
levels of command, lack of adequate intelligence support,
reporting by military sources of incomplete or inaccurate
information,30 the failure of civilian leadership to heed the
advice of senior military leaders concerning the overall risks of
the operation, and the inability of the military to anticipate
and protect against such an attack.31
With the memories of the Iran hostage rescue attempt still
vivid, the Beirut tragedy suggested that the deficiencies of the
U.S. armed forces that contributed to the debacle in Iran had not
been corrected, but somehow had worsened. Those sentiments began
to prevail, and even a successful military operation would not
arrest the congressional movement toward sweeping reform of DOD.
Grenada.
President Reagan came into office with the task of restoring
U.S. prestige, in part by improving the credibility of its
military capabilities. The U.S. experience in Lebanon did not
further that objective. It appeared, however, that the successful
use of military force for a just cause could restore the
confidence of the American people in their military and
government.32 Cuban activities on the island of Grenada
necessitated a military operation that was large enough to be
credible, but not so large as to present significant risk of a
large number of U.S. casualties.33
On October 25, 1983, 2 days after the Beirut bombing, the
invasion of Grenada, Operation URGENT FURY, began.34 The mission
was to secure and evacuate about 1,000 U.S. citizens, defeat the
Grenadian and Cuban forces present, and stabilize the situation
so democratic government could be restored.35
Taken in the whole, Operation URGENT FURY was a success; the
students were freed unharmed, the Bishop government was ousted,
Cuban troops were removed, and democracy was restored. Still,
critics reported many problems with the operation,36 to include a
lack of accurate, up-to-date maps, imperfect intelligence
support, and U.S. casualties resulting from accidents and
fratricide.37 There were interoperability problems among the
services, particularly in the area of communications.38 And,
although some forces acted bravely, they achieved only limited
success. Reportedly, U.S. Army units performed sluggishly, used
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inappropriate tactics, and suffered from breakdowns in
discipline.39 While the validity of such accounts has been
debated, the fact remains that the overall success of the
operation failed to preclude congressional criticism, and the
Reagan administration again found itself on the defensive.40
Congressional Reaction.
These brief operational sketches and the congressional
reactions they elicited complete the historical context that
shaped the widespread congressional perception that the U.S.
military was in need of reform. As early as June 1983, members of
Congress already were considering changes within the Department
of Defense. Senators John Tower and Henry (Scoop) Jackson, then
Chairman and Ranking Minority member of the Senate Committee on
Armed Services, for example, directed the committee staff to
conduct a study of the organization and decision-making
procedures of the Department of Defense. For the next 18 months,
the study took the form of hearings, interviews, and research. In
January 1985, Senators Barry Goldwater and Sam Nunn directed that
a more formal and vigorous study be undertaken.41

The Locher Report. The resulting staff study yielded a
report entitled Defense Organization: The Need for Change,
informally known as the Locher Report (October 1985, Study
Director: James R. Locher). The report indicated that consensus
was building in Congress that DOD required reorganization. The
essence of the report was reflected in the testimony of former
Secretary of Defense, James R. Schlesinger:
. . . in the absence of structural reform I fear that
we shall obtain less than is attainable from our
expenditures and from our forces. Sound structure will
permit the release of energies and of imagination now
unduly constrained by the existing arrangements.
Without such reform, I fear that the United States will
obtain neither the best military advice, nor the
effective execution of military plans, nor the
provision of military capabilities commensurate with
the fiscal resources provided, nor the most
advantageous deterrence and defense posture available
to the nation.42
The report addressed a wide range of issues affecting the
performance of the DOD, including its four major organizational
elements: the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the
Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), the unified and
specified combatant commands, and the military departments. The
report also addressed two key decision-making processes: the
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) and the
acquisition process.43 Additionally, congressional review and

7

oversight of defense policies and programs and civilian control
of the military received scrutiny.
The report went beyond the mere cataloging of deficiencies
and issues. It offered numerous recommendations for overhauling
DOD, its decision-making processes, and its organization. The
more significant recommendations included:
• to establish three new Under Secretary of Defense
positions for nuclear deterrence, NATO defense, and regional
defense and force projection;
• to create the position of an Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Strategic Planning);
• to disestablish the JCS and replace it with a Joint
Military Advisory Council consisting of a chairman and a 4-star
officer from each Service who is on his last tour of duty;
• to authorize the Chairman of the Joint Military Advisory
Council to provide military advice in his own right and designate
him the principal military adviser to the Secretary of Defense;
• to authorize the Chairman of the Joint Military Advisory
Council to develop and administer a personnel management system
for officers assigned to joint duty;
• to remove the Service component commanders within the
unified combatant commands from the operational chain of command;
and
• to integrating fully the Secretariats' and the Service
headquarters' staffs.
Although Congress did not directly act on any of the
report's fairly radical recommendations, the report effectively
illuminated numerous deficiencies within DOD.44 Moreover, the
report affirmed the congressional perception of the need for
change within DOD and helped shape the debates that would occur
over the next year. Congressional debate was accompanied by
Executive Branch interest in defense reform.
Presidential Reaction.
In June 1985, out of concern that Congress, if left to its
own devices, might impose ill-advised, or at least unwanted
changes upon the Department of Defense, President Reagan
established the Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management,
informally known as the Packard Commission (after its chairman,
David Packard). Establishing the commission also served to stanch
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any public perception that the executive branch was not willing
or able to reform one of its departments. The president charged
the commission to:
. . . conduct a defense management study of important
dimension, including: the budget process, the
procurement system, legislative oversight, and the
organizational and operational arrangements, both
formal and informal, among the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the Unified and Specified Command systems, the
Military Departments, and Congress.45
In February 1986, the commission provided the president an
interim report containing several recommendations. The president
officially endorsed the preliminary recommendations in April
1986, and designated many for "quick and decisive
implementation."46 The commission published its findings in June
1986. They were generally consistent with the conclusions of the
Locher Report released some 8 months earlier.47 However, the
commission's key recommendations were considerably less radical:
• defense planning should begin with a comprehensive
statement of national security objectives and priorities;
• the president should issue provisional 5-year budget
levels to the Secretary of Defense;
• the CJCS should prepare a military strategy and options
for operational concepts;
• the CJCS, with the advice of the JCS and the combatant
commanders, should prepare broad military options, framing
explicit trade-offs among the armed forces, and submit
recommendations to the Secretary of Defense;
• the CJCS, with the assistance of the JCS and the Director
of Central Intelligence, should provide net assessments of U.S.
and allied armed forces relative to those of potential
adversaries. The assessments should be used to evaluate risks
inherent in the options developed;
• the president should select a particular option and
specify an associated budget level upon which the Department of
Defense would base its 5-year defense plan and 2-year budget;
• the CJCS should be designated as the principal uniformed
military advisor to the president, the NSC, and the Secretary of
Defense, representing his own views as well as those of the
corporate Joint Chiefs of Staff;
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• the Joint Staff and the Organization of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff should be placed under the exclusive direction of the
chairman;
• the Secretary of Defense should direct that commands to
and reports from the unified and specified commands be channeled
through the chairman;
• the position of Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(VCJCS) should be created;
• broader authority should be assigned to the unified
commanders to structure subordinate commands, joint task forces,
and support activities;
• the Unified Command Plan should be revised;
• the Secretary of Defense should be provided with the
flexibility to establish the shortest possible chains of command
to deployed contingency forces; and
• the Secretary of Defense should establish a single unified
command to integrate global air, land, and sea transportation.48
During early spring 1986, while both houses of Congress
considered defense reform bills, influential congressmen such as
Senator Goldwater conferred with members of the Packard
Commission. As a result of these discussions, Congress began to
embrace the Packard Commission's recommendations over the more
revolutionary changes recommended in the Locher Report.49 The
interaction between the legislative and executive branches in
producing the package of reform that ultimately resulted is
noteworthy. Congress, in initiating the Locher study effort,
precipitated presidential action to form a Blue Ribbon
Commission. By forming the Packard Commission, endorsing the
commission's recommendations as early as possible, and committing
to their implementation, the president essentially was able to
coopt Congress and influence the reform package it ultimately
adopted.50
CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
Throughout the first half of 1986, discussions continued
over the need to reorganize the Department of Defense. On one
side of the debate was the U.S. Congress, convinced that reform
was necessary. On the other side were the Secretary of Defense
and the services.51 Interestingly, the president sided with
Congress.52 With the Executive Branch seemingly divided over the
issue of defense reorganization and against the background of the
Iran hostage rescue attempt, the Beirut bombing, and the
incursion into Grenada, Senators Goldwater and Nunn and
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Representative Nichols were able to build exceptionally strong
bipartisan support for reform.
During the spring and summer, each house passed its version
of the reform bill by an overwhelming majority.53 With the
Congress largely of a like mind concerning defense
reorganization, the joint conference to resolve inter-committee
issues went quickly and smoothly.54 The conference report was
published on September 12, 1986, and this substantial piece of
legislation sailed through the Senate and the House of
Representatives on September 16 and 17, respectively. By October
1, 1986, the GoldwaterNichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act was law.
Congressional Intent.
Traditional congressional concern over the migration of
control of the military from the legislative to the executive
branch has, in some respects, retarded the evolution toward
unification. Congress recognized the value of separately
organized military departments that competed to best meet the
requirements of the CINCs by offering alternative program
recommendations. Congress also perceived the need for more
unified direction of the U.S. armed forces, but feared that too
much centralization of authority might inhibit the discretionary
authority of Congress over defense matters. The provisions of the
1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act reflect these countervailing concerns.
The scope of the legislation clearly evidenced congressional
dissatisfaction with the lack of unified direction and action of
the U.S. armed forces. Congress believed the problems derived
from dysfunctional relationships among the Secretary of Defense,
Service Secretaries, CJCS, JCS, CINCs and Service components, and
the Service Chiefs. In passing the GNA, Congress intended:
(1) to reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen
civilian authority within the Department;
(2) to improve the military advice provided to the
president, the NSC, and the Secretary of Defense;
(3) to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the
unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment
of missions assigned to those commands;
(4) to ensure that the authority of the commanders of the
unified and specified combatant commands is fully commensurate
with the responsibility of those commanders for the
accomplishment of missions assigned to their commands;
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(5) to increase attention to the formulation of strategy and
to contingency planning;
(6) to provide for more efficient use of defense resources;
(7) to improve joint officer management policies; and
(8) to enhance otherwise the effectiveness of military
operations and improve the management and administration of the
Department of Defense.55
Each provision of the act addressed one or more of these elements
of congressional intent. An in-depth analysis of every provision
of the act is beyond the scope of this study. However, an
assessment of the more significant provisions provides a
sufficient basis for determining the extent to which the act has
served its purpose. The assessment that follows is organized
around the elements of the act's stated intent and supported by
analyses of key provisions designed to address each element.
ASSESSMENT
Strengthening Civilian Authority.
This section analyzes the provisions that directly impacted
the authority and control of the Secretary of Defense. Since
civilian control exercised by the Secretaries of the Military
Departments was not a major focus of the act, an analysis of
corresponding provisions is not provided in this study.
Congress formulated several provisions of the act to
strengthen directly the authority of the Secretary of Defense.
The two most significant provisions increased the secretary's
influence over program planning conducted by DOD components and
the contingency planning conducted by the CINCs. Other provisions
indirectly enhanced the secretary's control. The more significant
of those relate to improving the advice the secretary receives
from the uniformed military, thus enhancing his ability to
command.

Defense Planning Guidance. First, to increase the
secretary's authority and control over programs developed by DOD
components, the act provided that
[t]he Secretary of Defense, with the advice and
assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, shall provide annually to the heads of
Department of Defense components written policy
guidance for the preparation and review of the program
recommendations and budget proposals of their
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respective components. Such guidance shall include
guidance on-(a) national security objectives and policies;
(b) the priorities of military missions; and
(c) the resource levels projected to be available for
the period of time for which such recommendations and
proposals are to be effective.56
The authority provided by this section clearly empowered the
secretary to establish the criteria upon which the military
departments and other DOD components must base their programs.57
The secretary uses the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), a
classified document, as his tool for providing the program
planning guidance required by the act.
The DPG initiates the first phase of the DOD Planning,
Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS).58 The PPBS is the
biennial process by which DOD plans for the force capabilities
that will be needed from 2 to 8 years in the future. It
facilitates the development of programs to attain those
capabilities and translates those programs into budget
submissions. Those programs and budget submissions, rationalized
and synthesized through the PPBS, combine to form the Future
Years Defense Program (FYDP) and yield DOD's portion of the
president's budget. Thus, the DPG provides the initial policy
guidance for the program planning that produces the DOD budget.
By asserting himself in the program planning process early, the
secretary has enhanced his influence over the programs ultimately
submitted for approval.
A review of the DPG to date reveals that it directly
addresses and, on balance, satisfies the intent of the GoldwaterNichols Act. It summarizes the national security and military
strategies, outlines strategic challenges and opportunities,
provides some priority of military missions, and is consistent
with the resources expected to be available during the targeted
6-year planning period.59 Additionally, the CJCS reviews drafts
of the DPG and is afforded the opportunity to provide comments
prior to its publication. Through the DPG, the secretary
influences DOD programs early in the planning phase, and, by
putting his full weight behind the DPG, he sets the standard by
which the programs of DOD components will be evaluated. By doing
so, he has ensured that DOD components take appropriate notice of
his guidance and priorities regarding DOD programs.
This positive assessment of the secretary's promulgation of
policy guidance for the preparation and review of DOD programs
must be qualified. First, the specific priorities set forth in
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the DPG are few, and the guidance provided is, in many instances,
fairly general. This allows the military departments considerable
latitude in structuring their respective programs. That is
somewhat appropriate, since the departments require a degree of
flexibility if they are to craft programs that most effectively
and efficiently satisfy the CINCs' requirements. In developing
the DPG, the Secretary of Defense must balance the military
departments' need for planning and programming flexibility
against the risk of unnecessary duplication and redundancy that
may result in the absence of specific guidance and priorities.
Another criticism of the DPG involves the timing of its
publication. The GNA called for the Secretary of Defense to
provide his planning and programming guidance annually. However,
the need for stability in planning and for programming supported
by adequate analyses necessitates a two-year PPBS cycle. Since
the DPG, by design, initiates a new PPBS cycle, it logically
became a biennial document.
Congress, however, requires annual budget submissions. The
PPBS accommodates annual budget submissions by providing for
annual budget reviews and adjustments during the years between
those in which new presidents' budgets are developed.
Consequently, every other year, the secretary should be
simultaneously developing planning guidance for a new PPBS cycle
while making adjustments to a mid-cycle budget. One would expect
the mid-cycle adjustments to be relatively minor, given that they
continue to serve the two-year budget submitted the prior year.
What was perceived to be an exception occurred in 1993 when
the Clinton administration determined that a significant midcourse correction in the defense program was required. The
Bottom-Up Review (BUR) was conducted to chart the new course, and
it yielded an off-cycle DPG. With the FY 94-99 DPG published the
year prior and the FY 96-01 DPG still a year away, the FY 95-99
DPG was seen as an anomaly brought on by the new administration's
exercise of its prerogative to set a new course for DOD. The BUR,
its name notwithstanding, was driven by the OSD and the Joint
Staff and was conducted outside the established planning
system.60 Since each Service had developed planning and
programming processes to support the 2-year PPBS, their
participation in the BUR and the development of the resulting DPG
was constrained.
The FY 96-01 DPG was published less than 8 months later. A
year after that, the FY 97-01 DPG was published, again off-cycle.
Work is ongoing to produce the FY 98-03 DPG. Upon its
publication, annual DPGs will have been published for 5
consecutive years. Prudence dictates that DOD should have a
process for making budget adjustments during those years in which
new president's budgets are not developed. It is not clear,
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however, that annual reinitiation of the PPBS is helpful or
warranted. The DOD components, particularly the military
departments, require stability in the PPBS if they are to use
their forecasting, planning, and analytical processes
effectively.
There is no doubt that the provision of the GNA that gave
rise to the DPG provided the Secretary of Defense with an
effective means of asserting increased control over the
development of DOD programs. However, recognizing the DPG for the
powerful tool it is, a secretary could use it to the effect of
over-controlling and, thus, destabilizing the planning and
programming process. Ironically, while the secretary may be
complying with the letter of the GNA by publishing annual DPGs,
he may not be implementing the congressional intent of improving
DOD program planning.

Contingency Planning Guidance. The GoldwaterNichols Act also
increased the Secretary of Defense's authority and responsibility
in the area of contingency planning.61 The act provides that
[t]he Secretary of Defense, with the approval of the
President and after consultation with the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall provide annually to
the Chairman written policy guidance for the
preparation and review of contingency plans.62
The tool used by the secretary to implement this provision of the
act is the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG).
The CPG is a concise, classified document that the secretary
uses to inform the chairman of general and specific strategic
areas of concern to the civilian leadership for which contingency
planning should be conducted. The chairman then uses this
guidance to fulfill his responsibility to "[provide] for the
preparation and review of contingency plans . . .," also as
required by the GNA.63 The CPG also informs the chairman of the
general requirements of the secretary, or his representatives, to
review contingency plans during their development as well as upon
completion.
This element of the GNA has been implemented quite
effectively.64 The Joint Staff collaborates with OSD in the
initial drafting of the CPG. The final draft is coordinated with
the chairman before it is forwarded to the secretary for his
approval and subsequent submission to the NSC for presidential
approval. After the CPG is published, the Joint Staff translates
the policy guidance it contains into specific planning guidance
and tasks and inserts them into the Joint Strategic Capabilities
Plan (JSCP), the document by which the chairman tasks the CINCs
to develop operation plans.65 Using this guidance, the CINCs

15

develop plans peculiar to their geographic or functional areas of
responsibility. Even before the plans are completed, the CINCs'
strategic concepts are forwarded to the CJCS for review and
approval. The Secretary of Defense, or his representative,
selectively reviews strategic concepts of particular interest.
OSD-level review occurs again when the completed plans are
submitted for approval.66
Through the CPG, the Secretary of Defense has inserted
himself and his selected representatives squarely into the
contingency planning process. He has done so in a manner that
gives primacy to the policies of civilian leadership,
appropriately defers the actual development of contingency plans
to the uniformed military leadership, and, by involving himself
early, maintains effective civilian control throughout the
planning process. This is precisely what Congress intended in the
GNA.67
Improving Military Advice.
Several significant provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act
sought to improve the military advice given to the president, the
Secretary of Defense, and the NSC. The sponsors of the act
believed the JCS was incapable of providing concise, timely, and
useful advice to the National Command Authorities (NCA).68
Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, former
Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger bore out this
conclusion:
The existing structure [of the JCS], if it does not
preclude the best military advice, provides a
substantial, though not insurmountable, barrier to such
advice . . . [T]he recommendations . . . must pass
through a screen designed to protect the institutional
interest of each . . . service . . .[N]o service ox may
be gored . . .
The unavoidable outcome is . . . log-rolling, backscratching, marriage agreements, and the like . . . The
proffered advice is generally irrelevant, normally
unread, and almost always disregarded.69
Not only did the JCS system inhibit innovative thought, it also
was not an efficient decision-making system. For example, General
David Jones, a former CJCS, described to Congress how the JCS had
spent an entire afternoon arguing over which Service should
provide the attache to the U.S. Embassy in Cairo.70
Notwithstanding the widespread deprecation of the JCS,
Senator Goldwater reminded the Senate that the members of the JCS
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were given an "almost impossible task: to represent their own
services' viewpoint but, simultaneously, to sacrifice that view
to the greater common good of joint considerations." He also
pointed out that "interservice rivalry can be a good thing [and]
we wish to encourage competing views reaching senior-level
decisionmakers. But the JCS process does not encourage
independent thought."71
The congressional concern was echoed by the Packard
Commission. In its report, the Commission stated that "[t]he
president and Secretary of Defense require military advice that
better integrates the individual views of the nation's combatant
commanders and the Chiefs of the services." The report further
concluded that "there is no one uniformed officer clearly
responsible for providing such an integrated view, who can draw
upon the best thinking of, and act as an effective spokesman for,
our senior military leadership."72
To eliminate this shortcoming, Congress assigned increased
responsibility to the CJCS. In the GNA, it transferred the duties
and functions previously the responsibility of the corporate JCS
to the chairman, designated the chairman as the "head" of the JCS
and the principal military advisor to the NCA and NSC, and
directly subordinated the Joint Staff to the chairman.73 The act
further provided that the chairman, subject to the direction of
the president, may participate in NSC meetings.74 Additionally,
the act permitted the Secretary of Defense to assign overall
supervision of certain defense agencies and field activities to
the chairman.75 The act also created the position of the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assist the chairman in
discharging his new duties.76
However, Congress tempered the measures taken to increase
the chairman's authority with others that circumscribed it.
Notably, the act vested the chairman with no command authority.
The chain of command prescribed by the act runs from the
president, to the Secretary of Defense, to the CINCs.77 Also, the
other members of the JCS retained their responsibilities as
military advisors to the NCA and NSC. The act provided further
that should a member of the JCS disagree with the advice the
chairman intended to give to the NCA or the NSC, the member may
submit his dissenting view, which the chairman must offer at the
same time he presents his own.78 The act also provided that each
member of the JCS, after informing the Secretary of Defense, may
make independent recommendations to Congress.79 Finally, the act
provided that the chairman shall, as he considers appropriate,
consult the other members of the JCS and convene regular
meetings.80 While the act enlarged the chairman's
responsibilities and authority, it clearly did not intend for him
to become too powerful, nor for the JCS to become an inert
organization.
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The strengthened position of the chairman has been the most
intensely debated aspect of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. By the end
of General Colin Powell's tenure as chairman, a group of critics
asserted that the increased authority of the chairman had
resulted in less effective advice to the NCA because
recommendations were based narrowly on the chairman's views,
rather than on the range of opinions that might emanate from the
JCS. The commentators argued that several provisions of the act
combined synergistically to make the chairman much more powerful
than Congress intended. They claimed that his authority to
preside over the JCS and set the agenda for JCS meetings, his
command of the vitalized Joint Staff, his control of
communications to and from the combatant commanders and the
NCA,81 and his designation as the principal military adviser to
the NCA enable him to prevail on most, if not all, issues within
the uniformed military. Additionally, given the responsibilities
assigned to him in the act to evaluate Service programs and offer
alternative program recommendations,82 some critics allege that
the Service Chiefs are further discouraged from challenging him.
Thus, some commentators claim, the chairman can attenuate debate
and squelch dissent. They also argue that his increased authority
allows him to impose his views upon his civilian leaders.83
Referring to the increased power of the chairman as "the
biggest Washington scandal," Edward Luttwak charged that it
amounts to the "collapse of civilian control over the military
policies and military strategy of the United States." He went on
to assert that,
. . . the power of decision that our civilian President
is supposed to exercise through his appointed civilian
officials has been seized by an all-military outfit
that most Americans have never even heard of: the . . .
‘Joint Staff' that serves the Chairman and Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.84
John Lehman added to the debate by claiming the chairman
generally is not providing the NCA a range of options, but only a
single, take it or leave it, military option that ostensibly
represents the position of the armed forces on the issue at hand.
Referring to the framers of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, Lehman
opined that,
[i]n their understandable quest for efficiency, the
military reformers have consolidated the power
previously separated between the Military Departments,
disenfranchised the civilian officials of each service,
and created autocracy in the Joint Staff and arbitrary
power in the person of the Chairman.85
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Providing what probably has been the most severe criticism
of the chairman's increased authority, Richard Kohn described a
military that is "out of control." Quoting "a senior officer
involved," he asserted that General Powell instituted a system of
command and control in the Pentagon designed "to give the NCA no
options . . . to control the discussion by presenting just one
approach, which was the option of his choice."86
Assessing the merits of the criticisms is difficult because
their substantive bases are not always clear. For example, it is
not completely clear whether Luttwak, Lehman, Kohn, and others
believe that the office of the chairman was made too powerful by
the GNA, or that General Powell became too powerful a chairman
because of his personality and background. Interestingly, the
manner in which the current chairman, General John Shalikashvili,
performs his duties has not drawn such criticism when he, in some
respects, has gone even farther than his predecessor in
consolidating the authority given the chairman under the GNA.87
As a basis for his criticism, Kohn relies extensively on
accounts in Bob Woodward's The Commanders because "no one has
disputed its facts."88 One must remember that many of Woodward's
facts were not substantiated. Luttwak and Lehman, on the other
hand, provide no insights as to the bases for their assertions.
Absent an articulated underlying rationale, an analysis of the
argument that the GNA has brought about a decrease in civilian
control of the military accompanied by ineffective military
advice must be limited essentially to an assessment of the
argument's internal consistency.
In response to Kohn's criticism, General Powell stated that
"[o]f all the problems facing the nation, a crisis in civilmilitary relations is not one of them and things are not out of
control. . . . both Presidents Bush and Clinton expressed
satisfaction with the manner in which I provided my advice."89 If
there has been no perception on the part of either the NCA or the
chairman that there is something wrong with the manner in which
military advice is provided, then it is difficult to make a case
for a loss of civilian control and a concomitant decrease in the
effectiveness of military advice. If there has been reasonable
harmony between the civilian and military leadership, then it is
unlikely there was a crisis in civil-military relations.
Kohn and Luttwak's counter to this conclusion is illogical.
They argue that this very harmony proves the crisis. For example,
Kohn asserts that "[w]ithout any authorization from superiors,
[General Powell] developed a set of concepts designed to
reconfigure the entire military establishment [and] pushed his
vision of a new national strategy."90 The GNA not only authorized
General Powell to develop alternative force concepts, but
required him to do so.91 His authority to develop national
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military strategy was likewise derived from the act.92 It can
hardly be said he acted without authorization.
The illogic of Kohn and Luttwak's position is further
exposed by the fact that General Powell's superiors, including
the president, accepted his force structure and strategy
recommendations, although they certainly could have asked for
others from General Powell, the JCS, or from the secretaries of
the military departments. One cannot logically argue that because
the NCA accepted the recommendations of the chairman, a crisis in
civil-military relations somehow resulted.
Kohn applied the same flawed logic to the issue of
homosexuals in the military. He asserted that "at a time of
presidential transition, when civilian authority was vulnerable,
General Powell was ‘in the face' of the two most powerful
civilians in military affairs." But once again, the GNA required
the chairman to provide military advice to the NCA. The civilian
leadership may fully or partially embrace the advice, or reject
it entirely. The former chairman was obligated to provide his
best military advice, and that is what he did. The fact that his
civilian leadership heeded his advice is not evidence of even the
voluntary relinquishment of their authority, much less a
breakdown in civilian control of the military. To hold that the
president approved and the Secretary of Defense promulgated the
so called "don't ask, don't tell policy" because of coercion by
the CJCS, and not because of congressional and popular concern
that a more liberal policy might not be in the best interests of
the U.S. armed forces, strains credibility.
Contrary to the critics' charges, the lessons of the Persian
Gulf War provide evidence that the GNA strengthened civilian
control over the armed forces. With his role in overseeing
contingency planning expanded by the act, the Undersecretary of
Defense for Policy, in 1989, called for a change in the focus of
contingency planning for Southwest Asia. He directed that
additional attention be given to the defense of the Arabian
Peninsula against strong regional threats. Consequently, when
Iraq attacked into Kuwait the CINC was already well along in his
planning to repel and reverse such aggression. The Secretary of
Defense concluded that "[c]ivilian control and oversight of the
Department of Defense was enhanced [by the act] as was senior
civilian cognizance of the strategy and planning process."93
Congress, also, seems satisfied with the act's provisions
for improving military advice provided to the NCA. In passing the
act, Congress allowed that problems could surface during its
implementation. In presenting the reform bill to the Senate,
Senator Nunn observed that the executive and legislative branches
would have to monitor implementation to ensure the act produced
the intended effects and should to be prepared to effect
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modifications, if required.94 Representative Nichols made a
similar observation when he presented the bill to the House of
Representatives. He said, "[t]hose who have worked on DOD
reorganization realize that problems may arise in implementing
such far-reaching legislation. We will attempt to respond to bona
fide problems with legislative modifications when necessary."95
The express invitations to modify the act notwithstanding,
neither the president, the Secretary of Defense, nor the
Congress, has proposed any legislation to modify significantly
the chairman's authority and responsibilities. Therefore, a
problem in civil-military relations that would degrade the
military advice provided by the chairman is difficult to
establish.
Nonetheless, a key issue remains concerning the manner in
which the chairman formulates the advice he provides to the NCA.
There is evidence that the chairman may not always adequately
consult with the other members of the JCS before providing his
advice to the NCA. The chairman has promulgated a formal policy
that "coordination with the services . . . will be sought on
actions that impact on the services' plans or policies . . . [or]
for joint actions that will result in advice by the chairman to
the president, NSC, or Secretary of Defense . . . ."96 This
policy conforms to the requirements and intent of the act.
However, there are indications of inconsistent implementation of
the policy.
The importance of formal JCS meetings in the JCS conference
room appears to have decreased since passage of the GNA,
indicating a decrease in formal consultation.97 Also, just before
retiring, General Carl Mundy, former Commandant of the Marine
Corps, sent a letter to the chairman describing his concerns
about decreasing Service influence over joint issues.98
Additionally, the Service Chiefs were not given a reasonable
opportunity to consult in the development of General
Shalikashvili's first Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR).99
To the extent that the NCA are willing to accept the
chairman's unilateral advice, he may be more prone to give it.
However, such advice is apt to be less robust than advice
enriched by prior consultation with the other members of the JCS.
A return to the process of consensus building and voting within
the JCS, however, is neither necessary nor warranted; the
chairman is clearly the senior military adviser to the NCA.
Nonetheless, the chairman obviously can benefit from
consultations with the other members of the JCS, particularly
when the issues under consideration have potentially significant
impact on the services or when the services will be called upon
to implement resulting policy decisions. While some issues may
warrant formal JCS meetings, consultation on others could occur
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informally or through the proxy of staff coordination.
While the NCA's willingness to accept the chairman's
unilateral advice may not be a civil-military relations problem,
it can affect the quality of the advice the NCA receives. Given
the indicators that previously routine consultation with the
other members of the JCS may be eroding, it may be in the NCA's
best interest to establish policy that ensures the chairman
consults with the other members of the JCS, whenever the services
have vested interests in the issues under consideration.
The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, the bulk of the
evidence indicates that the act has not only enhanced civilian
control of the armed forces, but has also improved the military
advice provided to the NCA. In the official DOD report on the
Persian Gulf war, the Secretary of Defense noted that the
conflict was the first test of the act in a major war. He
complimented the chairman, the vice chairman, and the other
members of the JCS for the "excellent military advice" they
provided. He reported that the act's strengthening of the
position of the chairman enabled the chairman to bring to bear
his strategic insight and exceptional leadership to ensure the
CINC was provided with all he needed to successfully prosecute
the war.100 In addition to improving civilian control of the armed
forces, the GNA also provided more authority to the CINCs.
Expanding the Authority and Responsibility of the CINCs.
To reduce further the influence of Service parochialism and
better focus DOD strategic planning on the needs of the unified
and specified combatant commanders, Congress determined that the
roles of the CINCs also had to be strengthened.101 Congress
crafted several provisions of the act with that goal in mind. The
act reemphasized and clarified the responsibilities of the CINCs
for accomplishing assigned missions as well as for ensuring their
commands' preparedness to do so.102 It also described, in detail,
command authority, specifying that a CINC has authority to:
• direct subordinate commands in all aspects of military
operations, joint training, and logistics;
• prescribe the chain of command to the commands and forces
within the command;
• organize the command and forces within the command;
• employ forces within the command as he considers necessary
to accomplish the command's missions;
• assign command functions to subordinate commanders;
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• coordinate and approve administrative, support, and
disciplinary activities necessary to carry out missions assigned
to the command;
• select and suspend subordinate commanders and staff
officers; and
• convene courts martial.103
The act also provided that the Secretary of Defense shall
periodically review the authority of the CINCs and ensure their
authority is commensurate with their responsibilities. The act
gave the CINCs the responsibility to report promptly to the
secretary any instances in which they feel their authority to be
inadequate.104 Additionally, Congress considered terms like "full
operational command," traditionally used to describe the
authority of the CINCs, to be inappropriate for describing their
new authority.105 The act gave rise to a new term, "combatant
command," that DOD has formally adopted.106
The act further reinforced the CINCs' authority by directing
the secretaries of the military departments to assign all forces
under their jurisdiction to the CINCs,107 except for those forces
needed to carry out the 12 Service functions.108 Although the act
specified a single, clear chain of command from the president to
the Secretary of Defense to the CINCs,109 it notably did not
provide for an administrative chain of command from the president
to the Secretary of Defense to the military departments. Thus,
while the act allowed each military department to retain
unspecified authority and control over a portion of their forces,
the bulk of the U.S. armed forces were placed under the authority
of the CINCs.
Recognizing the geographic dispersion of the CINCs and the
broad spans of control inherent in the offices of the president
and the Secretary of Defense, Congress included provisions in the
act that allow the chairman to assist the NCA in overseeing the
CINCs. Specifically, the president may direct that all
communications between himself or the secretary and the CINCs go
through the chairman. The president may also direct that the
chairman assist him in the performance of his command functions.
The Secretary of Defense may assign the chairman responsibilities
for assisting in overseeing the combatant commands; however, such
assignment confers no command authority.110
Although the chairman is vested with no command authority,
his role in making the chain of command function effectively is
pivotal. In addition to making him the principal military advisor
to the NCA, the act designated him the spokesman for the CINCs,
especially for the requirements of their commands, and made him
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responsible for informing other elements of the DOD of the CINCs'
requirements. This provision of the act not only increased the
chairman's real authority, but also enhanced the ability of the
CINCs' to influence the NCA.111
Another provision of the act indirectly, but substantially,
increased the authority of the CINCs. It made the secretaries of
the military departments responsible for "fulfill[ing] (to the
maximum extent practicable) the current and future operational
requirements of the [CINCs]. . . ."112 In short, the CINCs were
made responsible for identifying requirements for military
capabilities, the chairman was made responsible for synthesizing
the requirements, and the services were tasked to fulfill the
requirements. Thus, the services were not to interpret, on their
own, the CINCs' requirements and base Service programs on the
capabilities the services determined to be most important to the
CINCs. Via the GNA, Congress sought to clearly establish the
primacy of the CINCs over the Service chiefs, at least with
respect to the determination of required military capabilities.
Whether these statutory provisions have improved the
abilities of the CINCs to accomplish assigned missions and
focused the services on providing trained, equipped, and ready
forces to satisfy the CINCs' requirements is debatable. Evidence
suggests that the impact of these provisions may not have been as
significant as Congress had intended. On occasion, responsibility
for accomplishment of missions assigned to a CINC have become
blurred. For example, after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the
Chief of Staff of the Air Force directed the Air Staff's Deputy
Director of Plans for Warfighting Concepts to develop a plan for
a U.S. response. The Air Staff unilaterally developed the plan
without direction from the Commander-In-Chief of the U.S Central
Command (USCINCCENT), the chairman, or the NCA.113 Given that the
Goldwater-Nichols Act clearly assigned the responsibility for
operation planning to the CINCs, the Air Staff's planning
encroached upon USCINCCENT's planning authority and
responsibility.114 The fact that the chairman directed that the
Air Staff's planning cell be expanded to become a joint planning
cell under the Joint Staff's Director for Operations115 did not
negate the Air Force's infringement on the CINC's planning
authority.
Another dynamic decreases the effectiveness of the
provisions of the act designed to increase the CINCs' authority.
Prior to passage of the act, two chains of command existed within
the U.S. armed forces. The operational chain of command ran from
the president, to the Secretary of Defense, through the JCS, to
the CINCs. The administrative and support chain of command ran
from the NCA to the secretaries of the military departments.116
The two chains of command converged at the level of the Service
components of the combatant commands. The Service component
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commanders ostensibly served two masters, the CINCs and the
Service chiefs. Congress concluded that the resulting ambiguity
inhibited the CINCs' ability to exercise command over subordinate
forces and to control resources allocated to their commands.117
Congress intended to solve the problem by clearly prescribing a
single chain of command that runs from the president, to the
Secretary of Defense, through the CJCS, to the CINCs.118
In passing the act, Congress intended that a CINC's
"subordinate commanders perceive [the CINC], rather than officers
in the military departments, as the superior whom they serve."119
Congress consciously abandoned the term "full operational
command" because of its historical connotation of circumscribing
the authority of the CINCs.120 In addition to prescribing a single
chain of command, Congress gave the CINCs the authority to
approve the assignment of or to dismiss immediately subordinate
commanders and principal staff officers. It also gave the CINCS
the authority to evaluate formally the duty performance of those
subordinates.121
The type and clarity of authority provided in the act should
have been sufficient to ensure unambiguous organizational
relationships. However, this may not be the case. First, the act
did not give the CINCs true control over the assignment of senior
officers to the commands. The CINCs can refuse to accept
nominated officers,122 but can "hire" officers only if they have
been nominated. By influencing the pools of nominees for senior
positions within the combatant commands, the services can ensure
the officers' residual loyalties after they are assigned. The
CINC's authority over immediate subordinates is further
attenuated by the fact that the services retain influence over
promotions and subsequent assignments of their officers.123 That,
combined with decades of Service indoctrination, causes senior
officers assigned to combatant commands to remain predisposed to
respond to the desires of their services.
A related difficulty results from the act's construct of a
single chain of command. The act does not allow for the "command"
of those Service forces that are not assigned to the CINCs.
Recognizing this reality, the chairman declared that although
there is only one chain of command, it has two branches: one runs
to the CINCs and the other runs to the military departments for
the forces that are not assigned to the CINCs.124 Since the
branching occurs at the Secretary of Defense level, the only
unidimensional link in the "single" chain of command is that
which connects the president and the Secretary of Defense.
Therefore, although Congress, via the GNA, sought to establish a
single chain of command, dual chains persist.125 It should be
noted, however, that the act placed the Service components
exclusively within the CINCs' chain of command. However, the
aforementioned promotion and assignment influence retained by the
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services may limit the practical significance of that provision.
Thus, the efforts of Congress to buttress the CINCs' authority by
clarifying the chain of command have not been completely
successful.
The CINCs' control over resources is also limited. They have
yet to achieve the degree of control intended by Congress over
the resources the services acquire and allocate to their
commands.126 Simply stated, in the GNA Congress intended that the
CINCs would state their requirements and the services would fill
them to the extent permitted by fiscal constraints. A process
that effects this intent has yet to be perfected.
At present, and for reasons that will be explored more fully
later, the services, not the combatant commands, dominate the
military requirements determination and material acquisition
processes. In addition to exerting primary influence within the
Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC),127 the services
control the concepts development and research and development
capabilities that yield potential weapons systems and equipment.
In establishing a priority for the systems and equipment he
requires, a CINC currently must do so within the range of
potential capabilities defined by the services. In short, he must
select from a menu developed by the services, and his Service
components may suggest priorities. The process that exists now is
largely one by which the services develop programs for potential
weapons systems and equipment and market them to the CINCs, often
through the Service components.
The CINCs' control over joint training and joint exercises
also remains limited. Currently the CINCs are not provided the
funds needed for joint training and exercises they must conduct
to ensure the readiness of their commands. They still rely on
Service funding.128 By controlling the necessary funds, the
services are able to exert influence over joint training and
exercises properly within the purview of the CINCs. The
Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (CORM)
recommended that "the CINCs be given more control over the
portion of the Service component training budgets that are
integral to joint training."129
On balance, it appears that the act strengthened the roles
the CINCs play in the command of forces, operation planning and
execution, and determining requirements for military capability,
but perhaps not to the extent envisioned by Congress. This
conclusion does not imply that the present situation is
unsatisfactory. It merely points out that the act has not been
fully implemented with respect to increasing the authority and
responsibilities of the CINCs and, thus, practical limits remain.
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Improving Strategy Formulation and Contingency Planning.
Through the Goldwater-Nichols Act, Congress sought to
improve strategy formulation at both the NCA and CJCS levels. At
the NCA level, the act required the president to "transmit to
Congress each year a comprehensive report on the national
security strategy of the United States."130 The national security
strategy report is to be submitted at the same time the
president's budget is submitted. It is to contain,
. . . the national security strategy of the United
States [including] a comprehensive description and
discussion of the following:
(1) The worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of
the United States that are vital to the national
security of the United States.
(2) The foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and
national defense capabilities of the United States
necessary to deter aggression and to implement the
national security strategy of the United States.
(3) The proposed short-term and long-term uses of the
political, economic, military, and other elements of
the national power of the United states to protect or
promote the interests and achieve the goals and
objectives referred to in paragraph (1).
(4) The adequacy of the capabilities of the United
States to carry out the national security strategy of
the United States, including an evaluation of the
balance among the elements of the national power of the
United States to support the implementation of the
national security strategy.
(5) Such other information as may be necessary to help
inform Congress on matters relating to the national
security strategy of the United States.131
In adopting the language of this section of the act,
Congress intended for the president to describe comprehensively
the shortand long-term national security strategies and to
provide assessments of the risks associated with implementing the
strategies. Congress could use the national security strategy
reports to make better informed decisions regarding funding to
support the various elements of national power.
An assessment of the national security strategy reports
produced to date leads to the conclusion that they have not been
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the comprehensive reports Congress intended. Their very general
nature has prevented them from being more than broad statements
of administration policies concerning national security.132
Consequently, their utility for enabling Congress to assess,
approve, and modify fiscal programs to provide optimally balanced
support of the instruments of national power has been limited.
Without the integrated and substantive evaluation of the balance
among the instruments of national power called for in the act,
congressional efforts to support them necessarily will
fractionate. For example, defense budgets largely have been
debated and defended as separate and distinct issues, and not
within the context of their contributions to synergy among all
the instruments of national power.
Presidential decisions not to fully implement this section
of the act are not surprising. First, to the extent the president
commits to a specific and comprehensive national security
strategy report, he yields flexibility in his ability to
negotiate with Congress regarding budgets and programs. Second,
the greater the specificity the president provides, the more
control he relinquishes to Congress for shaping the resources
allocated to support the various elements of national power.
Third, the more specific the national security strategy, the more
likely it will be at least partially invalidated by unforeseen
geo-strategic developments. Finally, a very specific strategy,
rigidly implemented, could preclude flexible foreign policy
development and implementation. It is understandable that the
president would seek to preserve his flexibility and minimize his
vulnerability to criticism by submitting national security
strategy reports that are sufficiently general to preclude
invalidation and which provide for latitude in foreign policy.
Thus, the presidents' decisions not to implement fully the
national security strategy provisions of the GNA can be at least
partially explained by the constitutionally-created tension
between the legislative and executive branches of the U.S.
government, a valued characteristic of American politics.
Nonetheless, by producing very general reports, the president may
provide greater opportunity for some members of Congress to use
the defense budget to provide home states and districts ample
supplies of defense "pork," even if it results in inefficient
defense spending. On the other hand, it is not clear that if the
president provided the specific and comprehensive national
security strategy report prescribed by the act, he would be
rewarded with more optimal funding for the national priorities he
set forth. On the contrary, he might discover that by committing
to specific national security objectives, a specific strategy for
attaining them, and the precise capabilities required to effect
the strategy, he may have to fight the budget battle with his
hands bound by the very strategy report he submitted. A more
general strategy can accommodate marginal changes without being
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invalidated, a risk inherent to specific strategies.
The above considerations suggest that, the requirements of
the GNA notwithstanding, the president should probably be allowed
a certain amount of discretion over how much detail he provides
in his national security strategy reports. This suggestion is
supported by the fact that Congress has never refused to accept
the general national security strategy reports submitted by the
current and past presidents. The apparent absence, however, of
congressional and presidential motivation for producing a more
specific report does not necessarily serve the best interests of
the nation. It could well be, as Congress believed when it passed
the GNA, that a more specific report would result in more
efficient application of national resources to national security
needs.133
Reluctance to address the specifics of strategy at the NCA
level seems to have permeated to the level of military strategic
planning as well. The GNA assigned the CJCS specific strategic
and contingency planning responsibilities. With respect to
strategic planning, he is to assist the NCA in providing for the
strategic direction of the armed forces and to prepare strategic
plans which conform to resource guidance provided by the
Secretary of Defense.134
To assist the NCA in providing strategic direction, the
chairman prepares a national military strategy.135 In 1990, the
chairman directed the revision of the Joint Strategic Planning
System (JSPS) to incorporate "the appropriate statutory
responsibilities of the Chairman . . . as delineated in the
Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986."136 This revision called for a
national military strategy contained within a larger document,
entitled the National Military Strategy Document (NMSD). The
strategy set forth in the NMSD was classified, reasonably
comprehensive, and specific. It consisted of approximately 50
pages of text that specified strategic objectives, assumptions,
and priorities.137 However, in 1992, the chairman significantly
altered the content and format of the national military strategy.
This new National Military Strategy (NMS) was (and remains)
unclassified and widely distributed. In comparison to its
predecessor, it read more like national military doctrine and
policy set forth in approximately 10 pages of generalized
narrative.138 Although the chairman continues in other ways to
assist the NCA in the strategic direction of the armed forces,
the formal NMS contributes only in the most general sense to that
process, notwithstanding the intent of the GNA.
The chairman provides for the preparation and review of
contingency plans which conform to NCA policy guidance.139 The
chairman's translation of the policies set forth in the
Secretary's Contingency Planning Guidance into specific planning
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tasks for the CINCs is promulgated by the chairman's Joint
Strategic Capabilities Plan. In response to the JSCP, the CINCs
develop operation plans and submit them to the chairman for
approval.140 In addition to the operation plans deliberately
developed in response to the planning tasks set forth in the
JSCP, the CINCs, following a codified Crisis Action Planning
(CAP) process, also develop plans for unanticipated
contingencies. The chairman is also actively involved in CAP.141
Although the Joint Staff, in consultation with the services
and combatant commands, continues to make improvements, the
contingency planning processes effected by the chairman satisfy
the requirements of the GNA. The translation of policy guidance
into operation plans, using both the deliberate and crisis
planning processes, was demonstrated prior to and after Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait. Following the guidance provided by the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy in 1989, USCINCCENT began
planning for the defense of the Arabian Peninsula against a
strong regional threat. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the
CINC had completed a draft of Operation Plan (OPLAN) 1002-90.
With the operational and tactical concepts, logistics concepts,
and force requirements identified through deliberate planning,
the CINC was able to apply the CAP process to convert the draft
OPLAN into an executable plan that yielded excellent results.142
In addition to providing for the preparation and review of
contingency plans, the chairman is also required by the GNA to
prepare strategic plans.143 A strategic plan, global in scope,
could guide the development of and integrate the regional and
functional plans developed by the separate CINCs.144 While the
current planning processes enable the CINCs to develop sound
regional plans, the chairman, due to his global responsibilities
and perspective, is best situated to reconcile, rationalize, and
orchestrate the CINCs' plans. The chairman's efforts in this
regard must be more than merely compiling the CINCs' plans.145 He
should proactively set forth, in a global context, the priority
of the specific objectives for the planning period, the national
strategic concepts for attaining the objectives, and the national
resources that will be applied, including how their application
will be tailored to best serve the established priorities. By
performing this strategy formulation role, the chairman could
ensure that contingency planning better adheres to policy
guidance and would be in a better position to provide strategic
advice to the NCA.
Providing for More Efficient Use of Defense Resources.
To complement the chairman's increased strategic planning
responsibilities, Congress designed several provisions of the GNA
to enable the chairman to promote the efficient use of defense
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resources. When combined, those provisions describe an integrated
process for determining required military capabilities and
ensuring their efficient provision. The process focuses on the
identification, synthesis, and satisfaction of requirements
identified by the CINCs. The chairman's role in the process is to
solicit the CINCs' requirements, provide national level analyses
of those requirements, assess the extent to which the proposed
programs of the services efficiently satisfy the CINCs'
requirements, and advise the NCA accordingly. Tools which the
chairman can use to fulfill these responsibilities include the
CINCs' Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs), the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JROC), the chairman's authority to evaluate
the preparedness of the combatant commands,146 and the Chairman's
Current Readiness System.
Three additional provisions of the act also enabled the
chairman to facilitate the efficient use of defense resources:
his responsibility to develop doctrine for the joint employment
of the armed forces; his triennial responsibility to appraise the
roles and functions assigned to the services; and his biennial
responsibility to review the missions, responsibilities, and
force structure of the combatant commands.147 This section
discusses the efficacy of the various tools that Congress
provided to the chairman to enable him to ensure more efficient
use of defense resources.

Determining Requirements. The act requires the chairman to
solicit the requirements of the combatant commands, evaluate,
integrate, and establish priorities for their requirements, and
advise and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense with
respect to their requirements, individually and collectively.148
The secretary then should incorporate, as appropriate, the
chairman's advice and recommendations into the written policy
guidance he issues to DOD components for the preparation of
programs and budgets.149 This process should ensure that the
services and other DOD components consider the requirements of
the CINCs early on, as they develop their programs. Indeed,
Congress intended that the chairman's assessment of program
conformance to the CINCs' requirements would ensure that the
services and other DOD components remained squarely focused on
the CINCs' requirements.150 Currently, there are two distinct
vehicles by which the chairman can help determine the nation's
requirements for specific military capabilities: the CINCS'
Integrated Priority Lists and the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council.
Integrated Priority Lists. The manner in which DOD
identifies, evaluates, integrates, and assesses the requirements
of the CINCs is not completely consistent with the model set
forth in the act. First, the chairman does not formally solicit
the CINCs' requirements. The most direct means by which the CINCs
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communicate their most important requirements is by submission of
their Integrated Priority Lists to the OSD Director of Program
Analysis and Evaluation, who formally requests them.151 The Joint
Staff receives information copies. The GNA, however, clearly
assigned the responsibility for soliciting the CINCs'
requirements to the chairman, not to OSD.
An associated problem concerns the use of the IPLs once they
are submitted. They are not rationalized at the Joint Staff or
OSD level with any type of overarching strategic plan that might
ascribe relative significance to the various requirements they
contain. Without such a synthesis, it is difficult to establish
an authoritative priority for the various requirements; thus,
their efficacy in predetermining the contents of, or forcing
changes to, Service programs is diminished. This allows the
services to retain considerable autonomy in identifying military
requirements and programming for compensating military
capabilities.
A third problem is that, historically, the IPLs have not
been timely. For example, the IPLs for fiscal years 1996-2001 (FY
96-01) were not submitted until mid-April 1994. By that time, the
services were well along in the development of their recommended
FY 96-01 Program Objective Memoranda (POMs),152 and it was too
late to incorporate new requirements of the CINCs. The best the
services could do was to compare the CINCs IPLs to the services'
draft program objectives and determine the extent to which they
coincided with the CINCs' requirements. It is also difficult to
see how the IPLs helped shape the up-front guidance provided to
DOD components by the Secretary of Defense, given the IPLs' late
submission.153 The effect of these problems with IPL use and
submission has been a lesser focus on the CINCs' definition of
the requirements of their commands than Congress intended in
passing the GNA.

The Joint Requirements Oversight Council. The above
conclusion is warranted, notwithstanding recent initiatives which
expanded the role of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council
(JROC) and inaugurated the Joint Warfighting Capability
Assessment (JWCA) process.154 The JWCA process assesses joint
warfighting capabilities in nine areas, ranging from strike
capabilities to warfighting readiness.155 The assessments were
intended to expose opportunities for improving warfighting
effectiveness by identifying requirements, assessing readiness
issues, addressing recapitalization issues, and developing
resource recommendations.156
Nine assessment teams were formed, each sponsored by a Joint
Staff directorate. Although the CINCs are represented, the teams
are composed almost exclusively of Joint Staff, OSD, and Service
personnel. The teams submit recommendations to the JROC, which
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decides the issues to be briefed to the CINCs and the
recommendations which will ultimately be submitted to the
chairman to assist him in formulating his advice to the Secretary
of Defense. Because the JROC membership consists of the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Vice Chiefs of the
services, and the services are better represented than the CINCs
on the JWCA teams, the services have more influence than the
CINCs over military requirements determined by the JROC process.
The JROC resembles the pre-GNA JCS except the JROC consists
of the vice chairman and vice chiefs of the services. It is
supported by the Joint Staff similar to the pre-GNA JCS.157
However, the JROC differs from the pre-GNA JCS in an important
way; by design, it serves the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. Therefore, it can remain consistent with the GNA so long
as it does not become an independent entity wielding influence
separate from that of the chairman, particularly with respect to
his role as spokesman for the CINCs' requirements.
That concern can be alleviated, to some extent, by the
chairman's interaction with the process. A case in point is the
recent debate over Theater Missile Defense funding. The JROC
recommended reduced funding for Theater Missile Defense.
Additionally, the Service chiefs drafted a letter for the
chairman's endorsement recommending that funding be reduced.158
The chairman resisted endorsing the Service chiefs' position
because the CINCs placed a high priority on Theater Missile
Defense.159 Thus, the chairman, in his capacity as spokesman for
the CINCs, provided a counterbalance to the services.
On the other hand, the influence of the JROC could grow in a
manner inconsistent with the intent of the GNA. It is noteworthy,
for example, that the council recently testified before Congress.
Its testimony was not confined to requirements for specific
weapons systems but included advice about overall funding levels
for force modernization and recommended personnel levels.160 For
reasons previously stated, the intent of the GNA was to improve
the quality of military advice by transferring many JCS
responsibilities to the chairman. It was not the intent of the
act to permit the chairman to create a shadow JCS, at the vice
chiefs level, to discharge the transferred responsibilities.
Presently, the JROC provides an effective forum through
which the vice chairman, on behalf of the chairman, consults with
the Service Chiefs through their vice chiefs. Nonetheless, if its
recommendations161 depend more on the consensus of its membership
than the integrated requirements of the CINCs, the JROC will not
adhere to the intent of the GNA. One means of preventing JROC
recommendations from becoming products of Service consensus is to
ensure the primacy of the CINCs' stated requirements within the
JROC process. If the chairman were to direct that the JROC must
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consider the CINCs' IPLs as the principal input into the JWCA
process and the basis of subsequent JROC deliberations, the
requirements of the CINCs would likely drive the requirements
determination process, thus furthering the intent of the GNA.
The chairman relies on the recommendations of the JROC when
preparing the recently instituted Chairman's Program
Recommendation.162 The chairman uses the CPR to influence the
programming guidance the secretary provides to DOD components.163
Additionally, after the secretary has issued his guidance and the
DOD components have submitted their proposed programs, the
chairman, as provided for in the GNA, assesses the extent to
which the programs meet the requirements of the CINCs and the
priorities established in strategic plans.164 He provides his
assessment to the Secretary of Defense via the Chairman's Program
Assessment (CPA). This report is also based on the JROC's
recommendations, which are drawn largely from the JWCAs. While in
the past the CPA had minimal impact due to lack of substance, the
current chairman has begun to use it as Congress had intended.165
The question is, however, do the CPR and the CPA adequately
represent the requirements of the CINCs, given that both
documents derive primarily from processes (JROC and JWCA) which
do not use the CINCs' stated requirements as principal input and
in which the combatant commands have limited involvement? An
affirmative answer would be appropriate if the chairman would
solicit, evaluate, and integrate the requirements of the CINCs
via the IPL process, and ensure that the synthesized requirements
serve as the foundation for the JROC's recommendations. The
credibility of the CPA, the assessment of the extent to which the
services' programs satisfy the CINCs' requirements, is
necessarily limited by being based on the recommendations of a
council composed of Service Vice Chiefs. Credibility can be
assured only if it is certain that the requirements for military
capability considered by the JROC focus on the requirements
originally stated by the CINCs. Otherwise, the JROC might be
accused of allowing the services to define the CINCs'
requirements and then allowing the services to assess how well
they satisfied the requirements they defined. That would be
contrary to the intent of the GNA.
A second criticism of the CPA is that it does not assess DOD
programs against the priorities established in strategic plans,
as required by the GNA.166 It is apparent that Congress intended
for the chairman to provide a key synthesis of strategic military
priorities, the requirements of the CINCs, and the programs
designed to satisfy them.167 Congress intended for the chairman to
establish and maintain strategic plans harmonized with the
defense planning period (2-8 years in the future) which would
contain national-level military priorities. Those national
priorities would not only assist the chairman in establishing
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priorities for the requirements identified by the various CINCs,
but would also provide an objective basis for assessing the
services' POMs. The absence of such strategic plans denies the
chairman one of the bases for conducting his assessment and
prevents him from completely satisfying that provision of the
act.

Preparedness of the Combatant Commands. The GNA further gave
the chairman the responsibility for "[e]stablishing and
maintaining, after consultation with the [CINCs], a uniform
system for evaluating the preparedness of each [combatant]
command to carry out missions assigned to the command."168 The act
also provided that the chairman should "[advise] the secretary on
critical deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities . . .
identified during the preparation and review of contingency plans
and [assess] the effect of such deficiencies and strengths on
meeting national security objectives and policy and on strategic
plans."169
To effect these provisions, the chairman implemented the
Preparedness Evaluation System (PES).170 Under this recently
abandoned system, the CINCs reported on the preparedness of their
respective commands to carry out tasks assigned in the JSCP. They
were also required to specify any significant force deficiencies
identified during the development of their operation plans. The
deficiencies reported would then serve as a basis for identifying
military requirements that may necessitate programmatic action.171
The ultimate product of the PES was the biennial Preparedness
Assessment Report (PAR) which was to contain the chairman's
combined assessment of the preparedness of the combatant
commands. Interestingly, of the three PARs produced, two did not
go beyond the draft stage. The third was approved by the chairman
but was not submitted to the Secretary of Defense.172
The PES was based on self-evaluations by the combatant
commands. The Joint Staff compiled and synthesized the reports
submitted by the various commands and offered some general
observations concerning overall preparedness. However, the Joint
Staff made no effort to evaluate independently the preparedness
of any combatant command. Nor did the Joint Staff assess the
effect that force capability strengths and deficiencies
identified via the PES had on accomplishing national security
objectives or on executing strategic plans. Moreover, while the
combatant commands reported their concerns and deficiencies,
there was no effective process for translating those concerns
into military requirements.
Another difficulty with the PES resulted from its
asynchronous relationship with the DOD PPBS, the process by which
military requirements become military capability. The PES
attempted to identify requirements for military capability by
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comparing current capability to currently assigned missions. If
programmatic corrective action was required, the requirement had
to be entered into the PPBS. However, the PPBS planning window is
2-8 years in the future, while the plans which exposed the
deficiencies were near-term.173 Consequently, if a deficiency
identified via the PES resulted in programming action, there was
a fair chance that, by the time the resulting military capability
could be fielded, its need would have been obviated by changes in
missions or in the geo-strategic environment. The DOD was
vulnerable to accusations of fielding capabilities which were no
longer required. Therefore, not only was the PES, as applied, of
little use in evaluating the preparedness of the combatant
commands to carry out assigned tasks, it had little utility for
identifying the military requirements of the combatant commands.
For these and other reasons, the PES was replaced in 1995 by the
Chairman's Current Readiness System.

Chairman's Current Readiness System. Rising concern during
1993 and 1994 over the readiness of the United States' armed
forces led to the development of a joint process for reporting
and assessing force readiness.174 The Chairman's Current Readiness
System (CRS), codified in a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Instruction (CJCSI), cited as its authority those sections of the
Goldwater-Nichols Act previously cited by the PES as its
authoritative basis.175 Under the CRS, the services report the
readiness of all major units and the CINCs report on their
commands' readiness to integrate and synchronize forces to
execute missions. This near-term process is based on current
readiness reports and 12-months readiness forecasts.176
The CRS has perpetuated, and perhaps exacerbated, the
aforementioned limitations of the PES. Like the PES, the CRS
allows each CINC to evaluate and report the preparedness of his
command. However, unlike the PES, the new system limits the
CINC's reporting to those functional areas that affect his
ability to integrate and synchronize forces.177 The services, on
the other hand, report the readiness of the majority of the
forces assigned to the combatant commands.178 In doing so, the
services are able to highlight the readiness issues of most
concern to them, and the CINCs are not disposed to vet the
services' reports.179 Therefore, Service readiness issues could
dominate this system that purports to evaluate the preparedness
of the combatant commands to carry out assigned missions.
The foregoing assessments suggest that a uniform system for
evaluating the preparedness of each combatant command to carry
out its assigned missions, for identifying force capability
strengths and deficiencies, and for assessing the effect those
strengths and deficiencies have on national security objectives
and strategic plans180 has yet to be successfully implemented.
Additionally, attempts to do so indicate that such a system would
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be appropriate for identifying near-term risks to carrying out
the national military strategy and could identify current force
deficiencies. Those deficiencies should serve only as a point of
departure for identifying requirements for future military
capabilities. An effective preparedness evaluation system would
have value to DOD and should be pursued.

Joint Doctrine. The GNA assigned the CJCS the responsibility
for developing doctrine for the joint employment of U.S. armed
forces.181 Joint doctrine can enhance the effective and efficient
application of U.S. forces by clarifying and rationalizing the
respective operational roles of the forces provided by the
services. Joint doctrine can create synergies within joint forces
that directly lead to increased operational capabilities at lower
levels of committed resources.
Since passage of the GNA, the chairman has made great
progress in developing a body of joint doctrine that does just
that, and more is yet to come. Currently, about 100 joint
doctrine publications are contemplated. That number will likely
grow as needs for additional doctrine are identified. To date, 62
doctrinal manuals have been published, and 30 more are under
development. They address topics ranging from the overall concept
of joint warfare to the focused conduct of joint mortuary
affairs.182 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John M.
Shalikashvili, recently increased the impact of joint doctrine by
directing that the qualifier that appears in all joint doctrine
publications be changed from, "This publication is authoritative
but not directive. . . " to "The guidance in this publication is
authoritative; as such, commanders will apply this doctrine. . .
except when exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise."183
General Shalikashvili also established the Joint Warfighting
Center and charged it to broaden understanding of joint doctrine
throughout the U.S. armed forces.184 The chairman has implemented
other measures to increase access to and understanding of joint
doctrine. For example, he has begun the repackaging of joint
doctrine publications into attractive, convenient, and easytounderstand booklets and has distributed a Joint Doctrine
Professional Library Desk Set. The set includes a CD ROM
containing the Joint Electronic Library, a collection of all the
approved joint doctrine publications, selected Service
publications, and doctrine related research papers. The chairman
also has made the library available on the Internet
(http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/).
While the development of joint doctrine has proceeded at an
impressive pace, the development process and its products have
been subject to some criticism. The criticism generally centered
around the fact that the development process was consensus-based
and analogous to the pre-GNA JCS system in that it fostered
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watered-down, bland doctrine. There was also a perception that
doctrine publications were biased by the parochial views of the
services that were designated as the lead-agents for guiding the
development of the various manuals. Since lead-agent
responsibilities were distributed among the services,
inconsistencies across doctrine publications arose.185
The chairman has taken measures to improve the joint
doctrine development process and thus the doctrine it produces.
Notably, the Joint Warfighting Center has assumed a more
assertive role in the management of joint doctrine development.
It recently established the policy that early drafts of doctrine
publications will be produced by joint working groups rather than
by the services designated as lead agents.186 That should preclude
Service parochialism from gaining initial, and often enduring,
footholds in joint doctrine manuals. Additionally, the Joint
Warfighting Center will assist the development effort by
establishing the joint perspective at the beginning and ensuring
it is carried through to publication. In that capacity, the Joint
Warfighting Center also will be in a position to help eliminate
inconsistencies among joint doctrine publications. These
initiatives and others will continue to improve the expanding
body of joint doctrine.

Roles, Missions, Functions. Under the GNA, the CJCS must
triennially review and recommend changes to the assignment of
roles, missions, and functions to the components of the armed
forces that may yield increased effectiveness and efficiency.187
Since the act was passed, two formal reports have been published.
The first, prepared under Admiral William Crowe, received little
notice. The second, submitted by General Powell, received
considerable criticism, not because it contained controversial
recommendations but because it did not.188 For the most part, the
report endorsed the status quo and contributed little to the
expected "peace dividend" because it did not identify ways to
reduce significantly unnecessary duplication and redundancy among
the services.189
In response,190 Congress mandated that the Secretary of
Defense establish an independent Commission on Roles and Missions
(CORM).192 Congress intended for the CORM to "review . . . the
appropriateness . . . of the current allocations of roles,
missions, and functions among the armed forces; evaluate and
report on alternative allocations; and make recommendations for
changes . . . ."192
After beginning its study, the CORM determined that Congress
had given the commission the wrong mission and that its proper
task was to assess how to better ensure that the CINCs are
provided the capabilities they need to fulfill their missions.193
Consequently, the CORM purposefully did not address the thorny
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issues of roles, missions, and functions allocations.194 Indeed,
the vast majority of the CORM's recommendations had nothing to do
with the allocation of roles, missions, and functions. Of those
that did, many were already under study by DOD or in some stage
of actual implementation. The CORM recommended that several other
issues be studied further before being implemented. Only a few
authentic, albeit relatively insignificant, recommendations
concerning roles and functions were made and acted upon.195
The current CJCS elected to endorse the CORM report rather
than submit his own triennial report.196 In short, since the GNA
created the requirement for a triennial assessment and report on
roles, missions, and functions, no significant additions,
deletions, or reallocations have been recommended to Congress.
One explanation could be that no significant changes are
warranted. General Shalikashvili, however, has offered another
possible explanation: such a task may be too difficult for DOD.197
The latter explanation is consistent with the CORM's failure to
recommend significant changes.198 One may reasonably conclude that
the Congressional intent regarding this subject, as expressed in
the GNA, has yet to be fully implemented.

Unified Command Plan. One final provision of the act that
influences the efficient use of defense resources warrants
review. The act required the chairman, at least biennially, to
"review the missions, responsibilities (including geographic
boundaries), and force structure of each combatant command and
recommend to the [NCA] any changes . . . as may be necessary."199
In fulfilling this responsibility, the current and two previous
chairmen have performed biennial reviews of the Unified Command
Plan (UCP). The UCP is the document approved by the president
that describes the unified command structure of the combatant
commands.200 Since the end of the Cold War, various Chairmen of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended several revisions of
the plan.201
The Commission on Roles and Missions suggested that
additional changes to the UCP are necessary to support the new
National Security Strategy and to conform to the post-Cold War
strategic environment. Specifically, the CORM recommended changes
that would enable the U.S. armed forces to adapt more rapidly to
changing threat environments and to reduce seams between CINCs'
areas of responsibility that straddle unstable areas.202 The
chairman's most recent biennial review, conducted after release
of the CORM report, resulted in significant, but different,
recommendations203 which were approved by the NCA.204 In any event,
the chairman, like his predecessors, has complied with the letter
and intent of the GNA.
Improving Joint Officer Management.
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One of the more significant provisions of the GNA addressed
"policies, procedures, and practices for the effective management
of officers of the . . . active duty list who are particularly
trained in, and oriented toward, joint matters . . . ."205 These
officers were to become skilled in "the integrated employment of
land, sea, and air forces, including matters relating to national
military strategy, strategic planning and contingency planning,
and command and control of combat operations under unified
command."206 Through joint officer management measures, Congress
intended to improve the quality of the Joint Staff as well as the
quality of the CINCs' staffs. Former Secretary of Defense Frank
Carlucci noted that Title IV of the GNA, Joint Officer
Management, was "the most extensive legislation concerning joint
officer personnel management in history and pose[d] the most
complex implementation requirements since the Defense Officer
Personnel Management Act of 1980."207
To facilitate the development of "Joint Specialty Officers"
(JSOs), Congress prescribed minimum requirements for the number
of joint duty positions that must be filled by qualified JSOs,
their education and tour of duty length, and promotion
requirements for officers who have served or are serving in joint
assignments. Implementation of those provisions has presented a
daunting challenge to DOD.208
Title IV's salient provisions included a requirement for the
Secretary of Defense to publish a list of the joint duty
positions within DOD and to ensure at least half were filled by
JSOs or JSO nominees. Furthermore, he was to designate at least
1,000 critical joint duty assignment positions that could be held
only by fully qualified JSOs.209 By 1988, the secretary had
published a list of 8,452 joint duty assignment positions, 1,000
of which were designated as critical. By 1995, the total number
of joint positions had grown to 9,075. Although the number of
positions designated as critical also grew between 1988 and 1993,
former Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney reduced it to the
congressionally mandated 1,000 by 1994, where it has remained.210
This action reflects the challenge of filling critical positions
with fully qualified JSOs. The difficulty stems, in large
measure, from the time required to develop a JSO in accordance
with the education and experience requirements specified by
Congress.
Title IV of the GNA also provided that an officer may not be
selected as a JSO until he/she attends a joint professional
military education school and subsequently completes a full tour
of duty in a joint duty assignment.211 In 1989 Congress elaborated
on the educational requirement by specifying that a two-phase,
sequenced approach be followed. Phase I instruction consists of a
joint curriculum taught in addition to the principal curriculum
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of Service colleges. Phase II consists of a follow-on, solely
joint, curriculum taught at the Armed Forces Staff College to
officers who are expected to be selected as JSOs.212 Presently,
joint professional military education is not only
institutionalized within the National Defense University but is
also becoming a larger part of the curricula of comparable
Service colleges;213 all services provide Phase I instruction in
their senior colleges.214
Title IV also required the Secretary of Defense to establish
a "Capstone Course" for newly appointed general and flag officers
that would prepare them to work with the other services. The act
required each officer selected for promotion to one-star rank to
attend unless the officer's immediately preceding assignment was
joint, there are no joint requirements for his/her field of
expertise, or it would otherwise be in the best interest of the
officer's Service that he/she not attend.215 Of the 660 officers
promoted to one-star rank over the past 5 years, only 45, or 7
percent, were waived from Capstone attendance, and, over the past
2 years, waivers have dropped to 2 percent.216 As with the
education of potential JSOs, DOD has effectively implemented the
Congressional intent with respect to educating new flag officers.
Generally, DOD has also been successful in effecting the
congressional intent that joint professional education be
followed by the experience of a full joint duty assignment. The
act defined a full joint duty tour as 3 years for flag officers
and 3 1/2 years for all others.217 In subsequent legislation,
Congress redefined the full tour as 2 years for flag officers and
3 years for all others.218 The act gave the Secretary of Defense
the authority to waive tour length requirements for any officer
so long as the average tour length for both categories of
officers met or exceeded the 2and 3-year standards. Additionally,
the secretary could authorize tour lengths as short as 2 years
for officers who had critical operational specialties involving
combat.219
Over the past 5 years, average joint tour lengths have
exceeded the requirements of the act. However, in the case of
flag officers, two of the services have exceeded the average
joint tour length requirement, while two have failed to meet
it.220 This notwithstanding, DOD as a whole has achieved the
stability in joint duty tours intended by Congress.
In Title IV of the act, Congress also set forth a method for
assessing whether the services assigned highly capable officers
to joint duty. The method was based on the expectation that if
high quality officers were, in fact, assigned to joint duty,
their promotion rates should match or exceed those of officers
not performing joint duty. Specifically, the act provided that
officers serving or having served on the Joint Staff are expected
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to be promoted at a rate not less than that for officers who are
or have served on the staffs of the services. Also, officers who
are serving or have served on other joint staffs are expected to
be promoted at a rate not less than that for non-joint officers
within the same competitive category. The act required the
Secretary of Defense immediately to notify Congress if promotion
rates for any selection board failed to meet the congressional
expectations and to identify any remedial actions the secretary
had taken or planned to take.221
DOD's record in meeting the congressional expectations has
been mixed, with sharp contrasts among the services. Over the
past 5 years, the U.S. Air Force failed to meet joint officer
promotion expectations for the ranks of colonel through major
general on four occasions. For comparable ranks, the U.S. Navy
failed to meet joint officer promotion expectations on one
occasion. The U.S. Army, for comparable ranks, failed to meet
joint officer promotion expectations on nine occasions, and the
U.S. Marine Corps failed on 11 occasions. This record suggests
that the implementation of the joint officer promotion provisions
of the act requires continued DOD emphasis, but it also points to
systemic problems yet to be overcome.
One explanation for why officers who serve, or have served,
in joint assignments are less competitive for promotion to
general relates to the varied promotion policies of the services.
In the Army, for example, generally, superior performance alone
will not result in promotion to general. In most cases, an
officer also must have served in qualifying Service positions
such as battalion command, key staff, and brigade (colonel-level)
command. In short, it is difficult for an officer to become
educated as a joint specialty officer, serve in joint duty
assignments, and still attain the Service prerequisites for
promotion to general.222
Exacerbating this situation is the fact that officers are
often assigned to perform joint duty at the point in their
careers when they are in critical competition for colonel-level
command.223 Since they are obligated to serve in the joint
position for 3 years, or 2 years with a waiver, they are rendered
less competitive during that time for Service command selection.
A delay of even a year in being selected for colonel-level
command means an entirely new year-group of officers is added to
the joint staff officer's competitive pool. Thus, the manner in
which a Service implements the act's joint staff officer
provisions can influence whether the congressional intent is
realized or whether quality officers will be discouraged from
seeking joint assignments.
Overall, DOD has made significant progress in implementing
the complex joint officer management provisions of the act.
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However, implementation has been imperfect in some respects. This
has been due primarily to the act's joint staff officer
management provisions' incompatibility with the promotion and
command selection systems of some of the services.
CONCLUSIONS
The DOD has substantially, but not completely, implemented
the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The provisions that were intended to
strengthen civilian authority over the armed forces have been
embedded within the DOD structure and processes. The promulgation
of Defense Planning Guidance by the Secretary of Defense has
increased his authority over the development of programs by DOD
components, but the act's requirement that the secretary provide
new planning guidance annually is ill-advised, and the recent
trend of producing a new guidance document annually denies DOD
components needed stability in program development. Major annual
adjustments in planning guidance will likely result in planning
and programming inefficiencies and decreased effectiveness of the
U.S. armed forces. Finally, if the DPG were based more directly
on the Integrated Priority Lists submitted by the CINCs and
contained more specific program priorities and guidance, the
services could develop programs that more efficiently satisfy the
requirements of the CINCs.
As a result of the GNA, the Secretary of Defense and his
designated representatives have become thoroughly involved in
deliberate and crisis contingency planning. Not only has this
strengthened civilian authority over the armed forces, it has
also brought about increased dialogue between senior civilian and
military leaders concerning the planning for potential or
imminent operations. The result has been better comprehension by
civilian leaders of the risks associated with various operation
plans and a concomitant increase in understanding by military
senior leadership of the support civilian leaders may lend to
various operations.
The GNA has improved the quality and the usefulness of the
military advice provided to the NCA, particularly the provisions
of the act that increased the authority and responsibilities of
the CJCS. The present relationship between the chairman and the
NCA conforms to the intent of the GNA. However, evidence suggests
that the chairman's position may have grown too strong in the
eyes of the Service Chiefs. The chairman can relieve their
concern by consulting them more frequently and enforcing Joint
Staff procedures designed to ensure adequate opportunities for
Service staff review of pertinent issues. That would have the
collateral benefit of enhancing the advice the chairman provides
to the NCA.
The act has not been fully implemented with respect to
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improving strategy formulation. The national security strategy
reports produced by successive presidents since passage of the
act have not been consistent with the act's requirements. They
have not been sufficiently comprehensive and specific. Although
neither Congress nor the president appears concerned about the
vagueness of the reports, the nation would benefit from the type
of report specified in the GNA.
Likewise, the act's provision for military strategic
planning has not been fully implemented. The chairman does not
prepare the type of strategic plans called for in the act. He
provides for the preparation and review of contingency plans via
the JSCP. But without the benefit of an overarching strategic
plan, the effective national level integration of the CINCs'
contingency planning is problematic. Similarly, the evaluation
and integration of the CINCs' requirements at the national level
and the synthesized assessment of the services' programs are less
coherent because they lack the substantial basis an overarching
national military strategic plan would provide.
Implementation of the act expanded the authority and
responsibility of the CINCs, but not to the extent intended by
Congress. Congress' attempt to specify a single chain of command
has not completely resolved the competition between the chains of
command to the services and combatant commands. Two chains exist
today except that they are called "branches" of the chain of
command. A single chain of command does not reflect reality. The
services must exercise command over the forces that are not
assigned to the combatant commands. The competition between the
two chains that still exists at the Service component level
causes the CINCs' command of the Service component commanders to
be diluted. That helps perpetuate the limited control the CINCs
have over resources provided to the commands by the services.
The real authority exercised by the CINCs is determined,
largely, by the extent to which the CJCS acts as their spokesman.
If he is a consistent advocate for the CINCs, their real
influence will increase. If he is more consistently influenced by
the Service Chiefs, the real authority of the CINCs will be
diminished. Thus, the manner in which the chairman performs his
duties is the critical determinant of the relationship between
the CINCs and the Service Chiefs. There are indications that the
chairman could be a stronger advocate for the CINCs, while still
consulting more frequently with the Service Chiefs. He must
ensure the CINCs' interests are protected within the Servicedominated JROC, that the Service Chiefs do not encroach upon the
authorities of the CINCs, and that the services program and spend
their training funds to support the CINCs' joint training and
exercise requirements. However, the chairman must also ensure the
Service Chiefs are afforded the authority and latitude they need
to perform efficiently the 12 Service functions.
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Contrary to the intent of the act, the services have
retained dominant influence in the military requirements
determination process. The JROC improved the joint
rationalization of military requirements, but has yet to achieve
the focus on the CINCs' requirements intended by Congress. The
Chairman's Program Recommendation and the Chairman's Program
Assessment are more influenced by the services than by the CINCs.
The CINCs' involvement in the JROC is limited and the chairman
does not formally solicit, evaluate, integrate, and establish
priorities for their requirements. Additionally, the CINCs are
not well represented within the JWCA process. Combined, these
factors have frustrated the intent of the GNA. If Service
programs are to be effectively rationalized by the Secretary of
Defense in this era of reduced resource availability, the CJCS
must provide useful advice to the secretary. It must be based on
his integration, evaluation, and synthesis of the CINCs'
requirements which, consequently, provide the unifying basis for
the Future Years Defense Program.
An effective system for evaluating the preparedness of the
combatant commands, identifying force capability strengths and
deficiencies, and assessing the impact of the strengths and
deficiencies has yet to be developed and implemented.
The CJCS has developed a robust body of joint doctrine that,
inter alia, harmonizes and rationalizes the operational roles of
forces provided by the services. In doing so, joint doctrine
facilitates effective and efficient application of defense
resources. The chairman's recent initiatives will improve both
the form and substance of joint doctrine, making it better
understood and even more effective. The congressional intent
regarding joint doctrine has been accomplished.
The lack of any significant reallocations of roles and
functions since passage of the GNA indicates that either the
roles and functions of the armed forces are optimally distributed
or have yet to receive the critical review Congress had intended.
The establishment of the congressionally mandated CORM suggests
the latter to be the case, and that Congress' intent with respect
to the triennial review of the roles, missions, and functions of
the armed forces generally has not been realized.
The congressional intent for periodic reviews of the
missions, responsibilities, and force structures of the combatant
commands has been realized. Successive Chairmen of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff have conducted biennial reviews, and several
significant revisions of the UCP have resulted. The DOD's
implementation of the joint officer management provisions of the
GNA has been generally successful. An effective joint
professional military education system has been established, the
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quality of joint staff officers has generally improved, and the
percentage of general/flag officers with joint experience or
training has increased. However, problems remain. Two services
have failed to meet the act's prescribed minimum joint tour
lengths for flag officers. Additionally, all of the services, on
occasion, have failed to meet the joint officer promotion
requirements of the GNA. There is evidence that the joint
education and assignment requirements of the GNA may, in fact,
inhibit an officer's potential for promotion to flag rank.
SUMMARY
The result of DOD's implementation of the GNA has been
continued evolution toward unified armed forces. The Office of
the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the combatant
commands, and the services are arriving at a balanced
relationship in which civilian authority is supreme. The lively
debate that accompanied the recent Commission on Roles and
Missions deliberations demonstrated that the services are still
distinct and independent, despite certain movement toward unified
operations and joint organizations. Implementation of the act has
not resulted in the combatant commands gaining as much, nor the
services losing as much, influence as Congress intended,
particularly within the resource management area. Service
parochialism has been significantly mitigated but still exists.
An admiral assigned to the Joint Staff summed-up the current
situation when he said, "I may wear a purple suit, but it is
still double-breasted." Increased effectiveness and greater
efficiencies are possible through further implementation of the
act. However, the DOD must ensure that the services are not so
reduced in stature and influence that they lose their motivations
and abilities to compete for scarce defense resources and
accomplish their other national security roles and functions.
Determining which portions of the act require more strict
implementation and what supplementary legislation is required to
achieve the increases in effectiveness and efficiency Congress
anticipated are the relevant issues.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Congress should insist that presidents produce national
security strategy reports that are as comprehensive and specific
as the act requires.
• The Secretary of Defense should promote stability in
defense program planning by reverting to a biennial Defense
Planning Guidance publication cycle. Congress should amend the
Goldwater-Nichols Act to permit biennial publication.
• The Secretary of Defense should establish policy to ensure
that the chairman adequately consults with the other members of
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the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Congress should amend the act to
instruct the chairman to consult the other members of the JCS on
all issues with potential impact on the services, while allowing
him to remain unbound by such consultation.
• The Secretary of Defense should conduct a review of the
relationship of the CINCs to their Service component commanders
and the latter's relationship to their Service Chiefs. The review
should affirm the chain of command from the NCA to the CINCs and
develop a concept for the chain of command that runs from the NCA
through the military departments. Congress should amend the GNA
to recognize, define, and describe both chains of command.
• The Secretary of Defense should establish policy that a
certain percentage of Service OPTEMPO funding be dedicated to
joint training and exercises. Congress should revise the GNA
expressly authorizing the secretary to do so.
• The chairman should develop national military strategic
plans keyed to the Future Years Defense Program periods.
• The Secretary of Defense, in accordance with the GNA,
should transfer responsibility for administering the Integrated
Priority List process to the chairman from the Director for
Program Analysis and Evaluation within the Office of the
Secretary of Defense. The chairman should restructure the process
so that it focuses on specific capabilities needed rather than
particular programs, and should use the IPLs as the primary basis
for determining military requirements.
• The chairman should develop and implement a system for
evaluating the preparedness of the combatant commands that does
not rely on self-evaluations by the commands. The system should
identify force strengths and deficiencies as well as assess their
impact on accomplishing national security objectives and on
strategic plans.
• As the Joint Warfighting Center matures, the chairman
should continue to increase its oversight of the joint doctrine
development process.
• If it is the sense of Congress that significant changes in
the roles and functions of the U.S. armed forces are required, it
should establish its own commission to identify needed changes
and propose appropriate legislation.
• The Secretary of Defense should continue to emphasize full
implementation of the joint officer management provisions of the
GNA with the objective of bringing all services into compliance.
• Congress should add language to the act which would ensure
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officers are not rendered less competitive for promotion for
having received joint education and having served in joint
assignments.
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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS
BUR

Bottom-Up Review

CAP

Crisis Action Planning

CD ROM

Compact Disc Read Only Memory

CINC

Commander-in-Chief

CJCS

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

CJCSI

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Instruction

CORM

Commission on Roles and Missions

CPA

Chairman's Program Assessment

CPG

Contingency Planning Guidance

CPR

Chairman's Program Recommendation

CRS

Current Readiness System

DOD

Department of Defense

DPG

Defense Planning Guidance

FY

Fiscal Year

FYDP

Future Years Defense Program

GNA

Goldwater-Nichols Act

IPL

Integrated Priority List

JCS

Joint Chiefs of Staff

JROC

Joint Requirements Oversight Council

JSCP

Joint Strategic Capabilities plan

JSO

Joint Specialty Officer

JWCA

Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment

NCA

National Command Authorities

NMS

National Military Strategy
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NMSD

National Military Strategy Document

NSC

National Security Council

OJCS

Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

OPLAN

Operation Plan

OPTEMPO

Operating Tempo

OSD

Office of the Secretary of Defense

PAR

Preparedness Assessment Report

PES

Preparedness Evaluation System

POM

Program Objective Memorandum

PPBS

Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System

UCP

Unified Command Plan

USCINCCENT

Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command

VCJCS

Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
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